

CATEGORIZATION AND SYSTEMATIZATION OF INSTITUTIONALLY-PROCEDURAL AND POLITICALLY-BEHAVIORAL ATTRIBUTES AND FEATURES OF SEMI-PRESIDENTIALISM: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CUT

The article is devoted to theoretical and methodological categorization and systematization of institutionally-procedural and politically-behavioral attributes and features of semi-presidentialism. The author identified at least two groups of causes and factors, i.e. exogenous and endogenous, that define and categorize semi-presidentialism: the actual content of a constitution, the combination of traditions and circumstances (exogenous causes and factors), the composition of parliamentary majority and the position of a president in relation to parliamentary majority (endogenous causes and factors). It was motivated that, within the same constitutional delimitation, a specific semi-presidential country can be classified in practice, first of all in the cut of varying institutional rules and formal/actual powers of presidents, governmental cabinets/prime ministers and parliaments. The researcher found out that taking into account the place and role of political institutions in inter-party competition and party hierarchy has a significant influence on this process. That is why semi-presidentialism was generalized as a system of government, which is comprehensively updated and taxonomied formally and actually. At the same time, it was recorded that semi-presidentialism uses specific hierarchical and transactional relations in the triangle “the head of state–governmental cabinet–parliament”. Their combination affects the formal and actual positioning and taxonomy of different types of heterogeneous semi-presidentialism. It was generalized that semi-presidentialism is definitively and permanently characterized with: a restrained and moderate model of separation of powers and appropriate system of checks and balances; popular election of a president for a fixed term; the collective responsibility of a prime minister and a cabinet to a legislature; the actual “securitization” of a president from interference in his or her activities by other institutions and branches of state power; actual (or at least formal), but multi-step and different deconcentration or dualization of the executive between a president (the head of state) and a prime minister (the head of governmental cabinet); double or dual nature of the origin and implementation of the executive, but not a double or dual nature of the responsibility of the executive.

Keywords: semi-presidentialism, president, prime minister, governmental cabinet, legislature, inter-institutional relations.

КАТЕГОРИЗАЦІЯ ТА СИСТЕМАТИЗАЦІЯ ІНСТИТУЦІЙНО-ПРОЦЕСУАЛЬНИХ І ПОЛІТИЧНО-ПОВЕДІНКОВИХ АТРИБУТІВ Й ОЗНАК НАПІВПРЕЗИДЕНТАЛІЗМУ: ТЕОРЕТИКО-МЕТОДОЛОГІЧНИЙ КОНТЕКСТ

У статті запропоновано теоретичну та методологічну категоризацію та систематизацію інституційно-процесуальних і політично-поведінкових атрибутів й ознак напівпрезиденталізму. Виокремлено щонайменше дві групи причин і чинників – екзогенні й ендогенні, – які визначають і категоризують напівпрезиденталізм: фактичний зміст конституції, поєднання традицій і обставин (екзогенні причини), склад парламентської більшості і позиція президента стосовно парламентської більшості (ендогенні причини). Вмотивовано, що в рамках одного і того ж конституційного окреслення конкретна напівпрезидентська країна може дихотомувати і класифікуватись на практиці, передусім у зрізі варіативних інституційних правил та формальних і фактичних повноважень президентів, урядів/прем'єр-міністрів та парламентів. З'ясовано, що значний вплив на цей процес має врахування місця і ролі політичних інститутів у міжпартійній конкуренції та партійній ієрархії. Саме тому напівпрезиденталізм узагальнено як систему правління, яка всесторонньо актуалізується і таксономується формально та фактично. Водночас зафіксовано, що напівпрезиденталізм застосовує властиві лише йому ієрархічні і транзакційні відносини у трикутнику «глава держави–уряд–парламент». Їх суміщення впливає на формальне і фактичне позиціонування й таксономію типів гетерогенного напівпрезиденталізму. Узагальнено, що напівпрезиденталізм дефінітивно і перманентно характеризується: стриманою та поміркованою моделлю поділу влади і відповідною їй системою стримувань і противаг; всенародним обранням президента на фіксований термін; колективною відповідальністю прем'єр-міністра й урядового кабінету перед легіслатурою; фактичним «убезпеченням» президента від втручання у його діяльність з боку інших інститутів та гілок влади; фактичною (або хоча би формальною), але різноступеневою та різною дуалізацією або дєконцентрацією виконавчої влади між президентом (главою держави) і прем'єр-міністром (главою уряду); подвійною/дуальною природою походження та здійснення виконавчої влади, а не відповідальності виконавчої влади.

***Ключові слова:** напівпрезиденталізм, президент, прем'єр-міністр, урядовий кабінет, легіслатура, міжінституційні відносини.*

As a whole number of scientific researches on the problems of semi-presidential system of government proves, semi-presidentialism being an independent type of systems of government's typology (alongside and in contrast mainly to presidentialism and parliamentarism) is endowed

with exceptional or overwhelming institutionally-procedural and politically-behavioral attributes and features, which allow scholars to distinctively systematize it against the background of other systems of government. However, the systematization of semi-presidentialism can be both political and legal (constitutional) that confirms both political (actual or behavioral) and institutional (formal or constitutional) nature of this system of government. To a large extent, it is understandable given the variability of approaches to defining and conceptualization of semi-presidentialism, as well as taking into account the fact that it is necessary to understand institutionally-procedural and politically-behavioral non-equivalence of the examples and cases of semi-presidentialism and consequently of its institutionally-procedural and politically-behavioral attributes and features. Since responding to the definitive essence of semi-presidentialism, they are extremely diverse and therefore cannot be reduced to a single model and common denominator, but instead need to be elaborated. This theoretically and methodologically actualizes the formulation of the problems of categorization and systematization of institutionally-procedural and politically-behavioral attributes and features of semi-presidentialism.

The stated issues were considered in an extremely large number of studies, in particular by the authorship of such scholars as Albert, Almeida, Amorim Neto, Bahro, Baylis, Braga da Cruz, Carey, Cheibub, Cho, Choudhry, Constantinesco, Costa Lobo, Duverger, Elgie, Elkins, Frison-Roche, Ginsburg, Huber, Jyranki, Kirschke, Krysenko, Lijphart, Lin, Ludwikowski, Martins, McPherson, Metcalf, Moestrup, Morgan-Jones, Pasquino, Pierre-Caps, Protsyk, Protsyuk, Radchenko, Roper, Samuels, Sartori, Schleiter, Serochina, Shen, Shugart, Siaroff, Skach, Stacey, Strøm, Thiebault, Tsebelis, Varnavskiy, Verney, Vesper, Weber, etc. Instead, our task is to systematize and correct them and based on this to develop a coherent idea of institutionally-procedural and politically-behavioral attributes and features of semi-presidentialism. At the same time, it is proposed to do in the constant attachment to the variations in definitions of semi-presidentialism, in particular from its origins to present day.

For example, Duverger, in the framework of the maximalist (classical) approach to the definition of semi-presidentialism, notes that the construction of analytical models, which are initially constitutionally determined, is atypical for scientists. However, on the other hand, it is inappropriate to consider inter-institutional relations without knowing the “rules of the game”, since they constitute the fundamental aspects of the strategy and tactics of the behavior of political actors¹ and thus determine why relatively homogeneous constitutions are tested and applied in absolutely different ways². Most often, under the conditions of semi-presidentialism, this is manifested in the fact that similar constitutional norms and prerogatives can be implemented in practice both by influential and nominal political institutions/actors, first of all by presidents. This, according to the scholar, is determined by at least two groups of causes,

¹ Duverger M., A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government, „*European Journal of Political Research*” 1980, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 166.

² Duverger M., A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government, „*European Journal of Political Research*” 1980, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 177.

i.e. exogenous and endogenous ones, which define and categorize four parameters/attributes of semi-presidentialism: the actual content of a constitution, the combination of traditions and circumstances (as exogenous causes), the composition of parliamentary majority and the position of president regarding parliamentary majority (as endogenous causes). At the same time, the only one of them (that is the actual content of a constitution) defines the concept of semi-presidential system of government in the maximalist (classical or “Duvergerian”) approach³. The fact is that since constitutions establish the “rules of the game”, which should be respected by political actors and institutions, their content affects the practical application of systems of government, in particular a semi-presidentialism one. However, constitutions are not and cannot be absolutely identical in determining the roles of political institutions (for example, the powers of presidents⁴) and, therefore, may predetermine the differentiation of systems of government, including semi-presidentialism. Moreover, the heads of state and prime ministers themselves do not always (behaviorally) adhere to constitutions and laws, thereby they informally strengthen or weaken their constitutional powers. The most important point in this cut is the understanding that the head of state or the head of government in the case of semi-presidentialism does not fully or excessively fulfill the powers conferred upon them by a constitution only because they expect some personal/behavioral benefit or interest in view of the political situation/practice and inter-institutional relations⁵. Consequently, it is often the case that constitutions do not play a primary role in categorizing and systematizing the attributes of semi-presidentialism, yielding to other parameters of typology/taxonomy of systems of government. This means that a specific semi-presidential state can radically differentiate and be classified in practice even within the same formal constitutional delineation.

In sum, such a categorization of the attributes of semi-presidentialism means that the material power of a president and any other political institution in the triangle “the head of state–government–parliament” is a combination of authority possibilities actually exercised by such institutions, which are based on formal (constitutional) and/or empirical (especially in view of relations within parliamentary majority) actions-resources. According to Samuels⁶ and Shugart⁷, the fact that president/the head of state is a priori “separated” from the other political institutions is a supplementary factor in the importance of political institutions in the conditions of semi-presidentialism. Since presidential mandate is clearly established and fixed (or, in other words, “protected”), as a result of which it is able to “use profits” from the separation

³ Duverger M., A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government, „*European Journal of Political Research*” 1980, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 166–176.

⁴ Duverger M., A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government, „*European Journal of Political Research*” 1980, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 176.; Duverger M., *Xéque Mate – Análise Comparativa dos Sistemas Políticos Semi-Presidenciais*, Wyd. Edições Rohm 1979, s. 22–23.

⁵ Duverger M., A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government, „*European Journal of Political Research*” 1980, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 178–179.

⁶ Samuels D., Presidentialized Parties: The Separation of Powers and Party Organization and Behavior, „*Comparative Political Studies*” 2002, vol 35, nr. 4, s. 461–483.

⁷ Samuels D., Shugart M., *Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers: How the Separation of Powers Affects Party Organization and Behavior*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2010.

of its term of office and the nature of its institutional origin, while politically limiting the role of prime minister. On the other hand, unlike presidentialism, both president and prime minister de facto have the right to veto appointments in governmental cabinet, which a priori weakens the institution of the head of state. The analysis is complemented by the fact that the symmetry/asymmetry of the powers of president and prime minister is variable. Therefore, as Almeida and Cho⁸, as well as Amorim Neto and Strom⁹ note, it depends on the specific institutional rules, in particular on the specific assigning powers of each of them. In addition, there are some misunderstandings in the attribution of semi-presidentialism according to its maximalist (classical) definition and given that Duverger, for example, does not mention anything about the origin of prime minister and governmental cabinet. Especially in view of the fact that in some semi-presidential states president has either a purely nominal constitutional (formal) powers or informally has the opportunity to appoint a prime minister and a governmental cabinet. This, according to Duverger's idea¹⁰, means that in conditions of semi-presidentialism prime minister must definitely owe his or her origin to the results of popular election of the head of state, even if he or she holds position due to the confidence of the majority in legislature. This is complemented by the fact that president is authorized not only to appoint/nominate a prime minister and/or a governmental cabinet, but formally or informally (through presidential and/or pro-presidential parties in legislature) to resign a prime minister and a governmental cabinet and sometimes to dissolve parliament in some semi-presidential states. At the same time, it is interesting the idea of Cheibub¹¹, Choudhry and Stacey¹², according to which the focus exclusively on the powers of one political institution (most often on the president), in particular in the conditions of executive dualism/dualization, causes the neglect of other political institutions and, in general, the institutionally-procedural and politically-behavioral nature and conditions of semi-presidentialism, and therefore is unacceptable. The fact is that the distribution and appointment of political powers among all the branches of government (all political institutions) in the conditions of semi-presidentialism affects the integral system of relations among them and, therefore, determines the structure and framework of their political power and influence. This, according to Moestrup¹³, Sartori¹⁴, Elgie and Schleiter¹⁵,

⁸ Almeida A., Cho S.-J., *Presidential Power and Cabinet Membership Under Semi-Presidentialism*, Paper Presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, April 3–6, 2003.

⁹ Amorim Neto O., Strom K., *Presidents, Voters, and Non-Partisan Cabinet Members in European Parliamentary Democracies*, Prepared for presentation in the workshop on „Politiske Valg og Offentlig Opinion“ at the Joint Sessions of the Nordic Political Science Association, Aalborg, August 15–17, 2002.

¹⁰ Duverger M., A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government, „*European Journal of Political Research*“ 1980, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 165–187.

¹¹ Cheibub J. A., Making Presidential and Semi-Presidential Constitutions Work, „*Texas Law Review*“ 2009, vol 87, nr. 7, s. 1375–1407.

¹² Choudhry S., Stacey R., Semi-Presidentialism as a Form of Government: Lessons for Tunisia // „*NYU Law Working Papers: Consolidating the Arab Spring – Constitutional Transition in Egypt and Tunisia*“ 2013; Stacey R., Choudhry S., *Semi-presidential government in the post-authoritarian context*, Wyd. The Center for Constitutional Transitions at NYU Law 2014.

¹³ Moestrup S., *Semi-presidentialism and Power Sharing Does it Work? Examples from Anglophone Africa*, Wyd. IPSA Paper Room.

¹⁴ Sartori G., *Comparative Constitutional Engineering. An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes*, London 1997, s. 121.

¹⁵ Elgie R., Schleiter P., *Variation in the Durability of Semi-Presidential Democracies*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S., Wu Y.-S. (eds.), *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy*, Wyd. Palgrave, 2011, s. 42–60.

means that semi-presidentialism is a system of government, in which it is constitutionally embedded (in contrast to presidentialism and parliamentarism), although in different ways, the possibilities of separation of powers, in particular between a popularly elected president and prime minister, who is responsible to a popularly elected legislature (that is between two parts of the dualized executive, each of which has a separate electoral mandate¹⁶). The problem is that the constitutional regulation of the separation of powers in the inter-institutional relations is often modified or refined politically that significantly devalues Lijphart's remarks on "the prevalence of the zero sum nature of presidential election" under semi-presidentialism¹⁷, and instead, according to Roeder¹⁸, it testifies a long-term stability of the system of checks and balances in semi-presidentialism.

Accordingly, traditions and circumstances are very important in this context, since the normative (legal or formal) delineation of systems of government takes place on the basis of consensus through the perspective of taking into account the course of history. Moreover, the practice of implementing systems of government generates unambiguous factual traditions, which quite often complicate and substitute legal manifestations of inter-institutional relations. This means that the powers of political institutions within the framework of semi-presidentialism can be distinctive in legal (formal) and political (actual) cuts. The endogenous factors that synthesize them are the composition of parliamentary majority (or even its presence or absence) and the position of political institutions (primarily of president and prime minister/government) regarding parliamentary majority. Thus, in semi-presidential countries, where parliamentary majority is not the norm, it can be seen, according to Duverger, the greatest coincidence and correlation between the norms of law and political practice, as a result of which the head of state is neither ceremonial (nominal) nor omnipotent in powers. Instead, in semi-presidential countries with a coherent and stable parliamentary majority, there is a significant inconsistency between constitution and practice, as a result of which the head of state is actually positioned either as the dominant political actor or as the only symbolic "leader" of the nation¹⁹. Taking into account the place and role of political institutions (in particular, president and prime minister) in party hierarchy also has a significant influence on this process. Consequently, according to Bahro²⁰, Weser²¹ and Braga de Cruz²², the idea of a presidential or a prime-ministerial phase of semi-presidentialism is justified by the type of configuration of parliamentary majority (or its possible absence) and by the affiliation

¹⁶ Stacey R., Choudhry S., *Semi-presidential government in the post-authoritarian context*, Wyd. The Center for Constitutional Transitions at NYU Law 2014.

¹⁷ Lijphart A., Constitutional Design for Divided Societies, *Journal of Democracy* 2004, vol 15, nr. 2, s. 102.

¹⁸ Roeder P., *Power Dividing as an Alternative to Ethnic Power Sharing*, [w:] Roeder P., Rothchild D. (eds.), *Sustainable Peace, Power and Democracy after Civil War*, Wyd. Cornell University Press 2005, s. 52.

¹⁹ Duverger M., A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government, *European Journal of Political Research* 1980, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 182–183.

²⁰ Bahro H., Weser E., Das semipresidentielle System "Bastard" oder Regierungsform sui generis?, *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 1995, vol 26, nr. 3, s. 471.

²¹ Weser E., Semi-Presidentialism – Duverger's Concept: A New Political System Model, *Journal for Humanities and Social Sciences* 1997, vol 11, nr. 1, s. 39–60.

²² Braga da Cruz M., O Presidente da República na génese e evolução do sistema do governo português, *Análise Social* 1994, vol 29, s. 243.

or non-affiliation with parties of major political institutions. As a result, the head of state in different configurations may actually be positioned as a “hyper-president” who has considerably more powers than a president in presidential system of government or as a “powerless” president who has fewer powers than the head of state in parliamentary system of government. Instead, the main attribute of the powers of various political institutions in the conditions of semi-presidentialism is the consideration of both the personal power of these institutions (in accordance with constitutions) and their influence on party politics and inter-party relations in legislature. Although semi-presidentialism (according to its classical interpretation, but in historical empirical practice) was not initially defined as party-dependent and regulated²³. Since, for example, in the researches of Weber, Preuss and Redlob²⁴, there was expressed a distrust in political parties, but instead there was a belief that the “plebiscituous” popular election of president must force parties “to more or less definitely obey the leaders who use a trust of masses”²⁵. In other words, due to the fact that the head of state is elected popularly and is characterized by personal charisma, he or she can resist bureaucracy and conservative social groups, including within the framework of parliament, as the guarantor of legality, stability, order and support of the continuity of power and its legitimacy²⁶. Accordingly, semi-presidentialism in this cut is generalized as a system of government, which is being comprehensively (in relation to all institutions of power) updated and constitutionally (formally) and politically (actually) taxonomied (in particular, in party and electoral cut).

In turn, Elgie²⁷ and Skach²⁸ (within the framework of the minimalist (post-classical) approach to the definition of semi-presidentialism) state that the most important attributive characteristic of this system of government is an “additional” division of power (that is the division of executive within the institutions of popularly elected president and prime minister/governmental cabinet, the last of which is collectively responsible at least to legislature), as well as distinctive legitimacy of the head of state and parliament. However, even this minimal set of attributes of semi-presidentialism does not mean that all the systems of this constitutional type function as identical in political practice. The fact is that the constitutional power of presidents, prime ministers and governmental cabinets varies as often as the political power of presidents,

²³ Shugart M., *Comparative Executive-Legislative Relations: Hierarchies vs. Transactions in Constitutional Design*, Wyd. Center for the Study of Democracy Paper 2005.

²⁴ Mommsen W., *Max Weber and German politics, 1890–1920*, Wyd. University of Chicago Press 1984; Meyerson R., *Political Economics and the Weimar Disaster*, Wyd. Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science Discussion Paper 1999; Stirk P., Hugo Preuss, German Political Thought and the Weimar Constitution, „*History of Political Thought*” 2002, vol 23, nr. 3, s. 497–516; Redlob R., *Die parlamentarische Regierung in ihrer wahren und unechten Form: Eine vergleichende Studie über die Verfassungen von England, Belgien, Ungarn, Schweden und Frankreich*, Wyd. J.C.B. Mohr 1918.

²⁵ Weber M., *Parliament and Government in a Reconstructed Germany*, [w:] Guenther R., Wittich C. (eds.), *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, Wyd. California University Press 1978, vol 3, s. 1452–1453.

²⁶ Veber M., *Parlament i Pravitelstvo v rekonstruirovannoy Germanii*, [w:] *Antologiya mirovoy pravovoy mysli: v 5 t.*, Moskva 1999, vol 3, s. 634–635.; Varnavskiy A., Smeshannaya (poluprezidentskaya) forma gosudarstvennogo pravleniya: prichiny i usloviya stanovleniya. faktory transformatsii v sovremennykh usloviyakh, „*Sotsialno-ekonomicheskiye yavleniya i protsessy*” 2010, vol 4, s. 297–300.; Medushevskiy A., *Teoriya konstitutsionnykh tsiklov*, Wyd. GU VShE 2005, s. 157–158. 202–203.; Demishel A., Demishel F., Pikernal M., *Instituty i vlast vo Frantsii*, Moskva 1977, s. 56–59.

²⁷ Elgie R., *The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism*, [w:] Elgie R. (ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 1–21.

²⁸ Skach C., The “newest” separation of powers: semi-presidentialism, „*International Journal of Constitutional Law*” 2007, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 96.

prime ministers and governmental cabinets alters. That is why constitutionally strong presidents are sometimes politically weak and constitutionally weak presidents are sometimes politically strong: presidents sometimes dominate prime ministers/governmental cabinets, prime ministers/governmental cabinets sometimes dominate presidents and sometimes none of them dominates each other (that is inherited from the attribution of semi-presidentialism in its maximalist (classical) interpretation). Accordingly, the concept of semi-presidentialism is so heuristic, how heuristic is the description of a specific set of constitutional levers of inter-institutional relations²⁹. It enables to generate/construct an analytical model that promotes in-depth and comprehensive description, categorization and systematization of the attributes of this system of government. Moreover, such an analytical model helps not only to trace and explain the historical and modern manifestations of semi-presidentialism, but also to predict them in future³⁰. It also defines a peculiar set of variables that determine why semi-presidentialism can be operationalized in different ways³¹. Among these variables there are the constitutional powers of the main political actors/institutions, the events surrounding the formation of a system of government, the nature of parliamentary majority and the relationship between it and president. In other words and according to Elgie³², semi-presidentialism is determined by constitutional (or power), historical, situational, regime (or contextual), political (party or inter-institutional) attributes. However, such a logic of its definition and attribution, in parallel, contributes to its typology and taxonomy.

The essence of constitutional or power attributes of semi-presidentialism is that (in the opinion of Duverger³³) at least three types of scenarios of its inter-institutional manifestation can be regulated by a constitution: a) when a president is only a “controlling force”, that is he or she simply appears as a guarantor of constitution and may have, for example, the right to refer laws to the constitutional court and propose constitutional referendums; b) when a president enjoys the above-mentioned control powers and is entitled to unilaterally dismiss a prime minister and dismiss a governmental cabinet; c) when a president is a “governing or ruling” force, that is he or she takes part in state governance, though in cooperation with a prime minister and governmental cabinet. At the same time, constitutional norms and political practices in the above-listed types of situations do not always coincide, since presidents who seemingly can act only as “controlling forces” actually act as “guides” and “governing forces” in some cases. The consequence is an understanding that constitutional (or power) attributes directly relate to the practice of semi-presidentialism, but are sometimes secondary compared with other parameters of this system of government. Taken together, these attributes de jure demonstrate the balance

²⁹ Duverger M., *Bréviaire de la cohabitation*, Wyd. Presses Universitaires de France 1986, s. 349.

³⁰ Duverger M., *Xeque Mate – Análise Comparativa dos Sistemas Políticos Semi-Presidenciais*, Wyd. Edições Rohm 1979, s. 89–90.

³¹ Elgie R., *The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism*, [w:] Elgie R. (ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 1–21.

³² Elgie R., *The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism*, [w:] Elgie R. (ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 1–21.

³³ Duverger M., A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government, „*European Journal of Political Research*” 1980, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 177–178.

of powers of various political actors and institutions and at least minimally de facto hint at the relationship among them.

The nature of historical, situational and regime (or contextual) attributes of semi-presidentialism lies in the fact that its operationalization is influenced by historical, political and cultural factors, within which a system of government is incorporated. Therefore, as Elgie³⁴ remarks, given that the context of each country is nationally unique and preserves for a certain period of time, and, accordingly, it can “distort” the implementation of the set of de jure constitutional norms in practice, then contextual attributes are mainstream in explaining different types of semi-presidential system of government. This is reasoned and important, because each specific semi-presidential country operationalizes this constitutional system of government in a certain geographical area, against the background of specific historical situations and within the framework of the dynamics of changes of a concrete constitutional/institutional “foundation and design”. Although, on the other hand, it is possible and appropriate to highlight some common features, which fit into the framework of the main types and scenarios of a “contextual design”: a) when semi-presidentialism is theorized and implemented purely for symbolic reasons (for example, during the process of national self-determination, when the introduction of the institute of a popularly elected, though weak president is considered as an instrument of democratization); b) when semi-presidentialism is introduced for the reasons of manageability and governance (for example, after the collapse of a parliamentary system of government, when creating the position of a strong popularly elected president is considered as an instrument to prevent political crises in future); c) when semi-presidentialism is perceived as the stage of transition of political system and political regime to democracy (for example, when the institution of a stronger popularly elected president plays the role of reforming parliamentarism or the introduction of the institution of a weaker popularly elected president plays the role of reforming presidentialism, etc.) or to autocracy (for example, when the institution of a popularly elected president strengthens or weakens the position of a prime minister on the way of diversifying the personalization of political power). In general, this proves that, whatever are the historical, political and cultural factors of the introduction of semi-presidentialism, the contextual component that determines a way of choice and development of this system of government generates rather diverse and varied political practices of semi-presidentialism. In other words, the events around the choice and formation of a semi-presidential system of government are crucial to understanding politics within its framework. The point is that the main or very important role is played by the norms, rules and practices that (for the first time since the implementation of semi-presidentialism) determine the positioning of the various political actors/institutions and the relationship among them. In addition, an important role is played by the expectations of political elite from the fact of introduction of a semi-presidential system of government or its type's change, in particular in contrast to another constitutional model.

³⁴ Elgie R., *The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism*, [w:] Elgie R. (ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 1–21.

Finally, the specificity of political or party (inter-institutional) attributes of semi-presidentialism is that this system of government is always determined by party and political factors, which, according to Duverger, are even “more important than constitutional powers” of various political actors/institutions, and therefore they influence the different typological positioning of the investigated type of inter-institutional relations³⁵. First and foremost, the determining factor in this perspective is a presence or absence of a parliamentary majority (minority) in legislature, as well as the type of its relations with a president and prime minister (governmental cabinet). Based on this, Elgie³⁶ sets out several scenarios of political (party) attributes of semi-presidentialism: a) when there is an one-party absolute parliamentary majority with the dominant party; b) when there is a coalitional absolute parliamentary majority consisting of one large, but non-dominant party; c) when there is a balanced coalitional absolute parliamentary majority without any large party; d) when there is an one-party relative parliamentary majority (or an absolute parliamentary minority); e) when there is a coalitional relative parliamentary majority (or an absolute parliamentary minority); f) when there is no absolute or relative parliamentary majority, but instead it is determined situationally. The importance of these scenarios is that the nature of parliamentary majority or minority may acquire different inter-party forms and therefore can diversify influence inter-institutional relations in the triangle “the head of state–government–parliament” and the relationship between president and majority or minority in legislature. For example, a president may be the leader of an absolute majority or minority in legislature or may be only its participant. Equivalently, a president may be the representative of the interests of a party from parliamentary opposition or even a completely neutral and apolitical (non-partisan) figure. Accordingly, such political and party attributes of inter-institutional relations are informative in the context of explaining the differences between various scenarios and types of semi-presidentialism.

Correcting the maximalist (classical) attribution and updating the minimalist (post-classical) attribution of semi-presidentialism, Shugart³⁷ (unlike his early ideas³⁸) observes that this system of government (in comparison with presidentialism and parliamentarism) uses its inherent hierarchical and transactional relations (or, in other words, the sources of legitimacy in the form of origin and strength of power) in the triangle “the head of state–government–parliament”. Thus, semi-presidentialism in hierarchical relations is determined by the fact that some political institutions are subordinated to others, and in transactional relations it is characterized by the fact that political institutions are or may be “identical” or equivalent. The difference between parliamentarism and presidentialism is that in the first case hierarchical relations extend between legislature and its “subordinates” (first of all, governmental cabinet) and in the second case, due

³⁵ Duverger M., *Institutions politiques et droit constitutionnel*, Wyd. Presses Universitaires de France 1971, s. 116.; Duverger M., *Xeque Mate – Análise Comparativa dos Sistemas Políticos Semi-Presidenciais*, Wyd. Edições Rohm 1979, s. 89–90.

³⁶ Elgie R., *The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism*, [w:] Elgie R. (ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 1–21.

³⁷ Shugart M., Semi-presidential systems: Dual executive and mixed authority patterns, “*French Politics*” 2005, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 328.

³⁸ Shugart M., Carey J., *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992.

to the divided legitimacy of president and legislature, inter-institutional relations are purely transactional, since they are determined by the achievement of distinctive goals. This means that semi-presidentialism is inter-institutionally multidirectional one, since it is defined by the “constellation” of both hierarchical and transactional patterns. Their combination affects the actual (politically-behavioral) positioning of semi-presidentialism and hence the allocation of various types of semi-presidentialism in different modes of its constitutional (power), historical, situational, regime (contextual), political (party or inter-institutional) attributes. Moreover, as a result of such a synthesis of inter-institutional relations, it is clear that semi-presidentialism is determined by: a) the comparison/superposition of institutions of a popularly elected president and governmental cabinet, which is responsible to legislature; b) the probability that one institution (“principal”), which forms another institution (“agent”), cannot be unilaterally authorized to terminate its functions. It shows the theoretical and methodological failure to attribute semi-presidentialism as a constitutional and inter-institutional type, which is reflected in the alternation of presidential and parliamentary phases of the political system in practice³⁹. Providing this, Shugart delineates the institutional attributes of political system and its politically-behavioral results, and observes that even if president becomes more or less “influential” (depending on whether he or she is able to control government and parliamentary majority (or minority)) this completely does not affect the institutional design of political system (or system of government), although it creates various behavioral models for its testing and verification. The point is that each system of government, including a semi-presidential one, is characterized by its inherent characteristics that are extremely difficult or impossible to change. These characteristics and attributes are related to the institutional structure of system of government and therefore clearly determine whether it is parliamentary, presidential or semi-presidential. In contrast, only temporary or transitive characteristics of systems of government, including electoral results and the type of party system that define a model of politically-behavioral attribution of the institutional (or institutionally-procedural) type of systems of government, are subject to change⁴⁰. In sum, this means that Shugart’s logic of attribution (and defining) of semi-presidentialism, unlike the “pure” minimalist approach, is determined by three indicators – a source of legitimacy of executive institutions, relations between legislative and executive institutions, the nature of responsibility of executive institutions. The consequence is the construction of the basis of the analytical model, which enables better and more versatile analysis of semi-presidentialism, its attributes and characteristics, organizational requirements and operational consequences.

They are conceptualized and verified in the framework of the theory of agent (“principal-agent”) relations, in particular, in the researches of such scholars as Shugart, Carey and

³⁹ Shugart M., Semi-presidential systems: Dual executive and mixed authority patterns, *French Politics* 2005, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 328.

⁴⁰ Shugart M., Of Presidents and Parliaments, *East European Constitutional Review* 1993, vol 2, nr. 1, s. 30.

Samuels⁴¹, Lupia⁴², Amorim Neto, Strom, Mueller and Bergman⁴³, Schleiter and Morgan-Jones⁴⁴, Huber⁴⁵, Constantinesco and Pierre-Caps⁴⁶, Martins⁴⁷, Jyranki⁴⁸ and others. The aforementioned researchers point out that the theory of agent relations focuses on the delegation of authority (powers) and responsibility (accountability) from voters (as the main “principal”) to elected officials, in particular to president and legislature (as “agents”), and from them (as “principals”) to governmental cabinet (as “agent”) and vice versa⁴⁹. This means that political process, at least in democratic regimes, should be a priori, albeit in different ways (for example, in presidentialism, semi-presidentialism and parliamentarism)⁵⁰, determined by electorate, since all “agents” of voters must be responsible and accountable to them⁵¹. The peculiarity of semi-presidentialism is that voters choose two “agents” whom they delegate the rights and opportunities to act on their behalf, i.e. the head of state and parliament. Therefore, semi-presidentialism (as well as presidentialism) is determined by the double legitimacy of the main “agents”. Another

⁴¹ Shugart M., Carey J., *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992.; Shugart M., Semi-presidential systems: Dual executive and mixed authority patterns, “*French Politics*” 2005, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 323–351.; Samuels D., Shugart M., *Presidents, Prime Ministers and Parties: A Neo-Madisonian Theory of Party Organization and Behaviour*, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia 2006.; Shugart M., *Comparative Executive-Legislative Relations*, [w:] Rhodes A. W., Binder S., Rockman B. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2006, s. 344–365.; Shugart M., *Comparative Executive-Legislative Relations: Hierarchies vs. Transactions in Constitutional Design*, Wyd. Center for the Study of Democracy Paper 2005.

⁴² Lupia A., *Delegation and Its Perils*, [w:] Strom K., Müller W., Bergman T. (eds.), *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2003, s. 33–54.

⁴³ Amorim Neto O., Strøm K., Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies, „*British Journal of Political Science*” 2006, vol 36, nr. 4, s. 619–643.; Amorim Neto O., Strøm K., *Presidents, Voters, and Non-Partisan Cabinet Members in European Parliamentary Democracies*, Prepared for presentation in the workshop on „Politiske Valg og Offentlig Opinion” at the Joint Sessions of the Nordic Political Science Association, Aalborg, August 15–17, 2002.; Strom K., *Parliamentary democracy and delegation*, [w:] Strøm K., Müller W., Bergman T. (eds.), *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2003, s. 55–108.; Strøm K., Müller W., Bergman T., Nyblade B., *Dimensions of citizen control*, [w:] Strøm K., Müller W., Bergman T. (eds.), *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2003, s. 673–681.; Strøm K., Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies, “*European Journal of Political Research*” 2000, vol 37, nr. 3, s. 309–333.; Strøm K., Müller W., *Parliamentary Government and Legislative Organization*, [w:] Döring H. (ed.), *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, Wyd. Campus Verlag 1995, s. 51–82.

⁴⁴ Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., Citizens, Presidents and Assemblies: The Study of Semi-Presidentialism beyond Duverger and Linz, „*British Journal of Political Science*” 2009, vol 39, nr. 4, s. 871–992.; Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., Party Government in Europe? Parliamentary and Semipresidential Democracies Compared, “*European Journal of Political Research*” 2009, vol 48, nr. 5, s. 665–693.; Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., Party Control over European Cabinets?, “*European Journal of Political Research*” 2009, vol 48, nr. 4, s. 665–693.; Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., Who’s in Charge? Presidents, Assemblies, and the Political Control of Semipresidential Cabinets, “*Comparative Political Studies*” 2010, vol 43, nr. 11, s. 1415–1441.; Morgan-Jones E., Schleiter P., Governmental change in a president-parliamentary regime: The case of Russia 1994–2003, „*Post-Soviet Affairs*” 2004, vol 20, nr. 2, s. 132–163.

⁴⁵ Huber J., *Rationalizing Parliament: Legislative Institutions and Party Politics in France*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.

⁴⁶ Constantinesco V., Pierré-Caps S., Presidential Elements of Government in France: The Quest for Political Responsibility of the President in the Fifth Republic, „*European Constitutional Law Review*” 2006, vol 2, s. 341–357.

⁴⁷ Martins A., Presidential Elements in Government. The Portuguese Semi-Presidential System, „*European Constitutional Law Review*” 2006, vol 2, nr. 1, s. 81–100.

⁴⁸ Jyranki A., Presidential Elements in Government. Finland, Foreign Affairs as the Last Stronghold of the President, „*European Constitutional Law Review*” 2007, vol 3, nr. 2, s. 285–306.

⁴⁹ Moe T., The New Economics of Organization, “*American Journal of Political Science*” 1984, vol 28, nr. 4, s. 739–777.; Lupia A., *Delegation and Its Perils*, [w:] Strom K., Müller W., Bergman T. (eds.), *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2003, s. 33–54.; Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., Party Government in Europe? Parliamentary and Semipresidential Democracies Compared, “*European Journal of Political Research*” 2009, vol 48, nr. 5, s. 665–693.

⁵⁰ Strøm K., Müller W., *Parliamentary Government and Legislative Organization*, [w:] Döring H. (ed.), *Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe*, Wyd. Campus Verlag 1995, s. 74.

⁵¹ Shugart M., Semi-presidential systems: Dual executive and mixed authority patterns, “*French Politics*” 2005, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 323–351.; Shugart M., *Comparative Executive-Legislative Relations*, [w:] Rhodes A. W., Binder S., Rockman B. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2006, s. 344–365.

feature is that these “agents” at the same time are able to structurize and streamline the process of formation and functioning (and even responsibility) of governmental cabinets. Therefore, semi-presidentialism has the attribute of the executive dualism. At the same time, semi-presidentialism ambiguously subordinate governmental cabinet to president and parliament, since the “survival” of governmental cabinet depends, on the one hand, on the confidence or lack of no confidence of legislature and, on the other hand, on popular election of president as a channel for voters to influence the process of governance. Especially in view of the fact that presidents in semi-presidential countries are usually given at least one of the proposed powers, i.e. to form a governmental cabinet, to resign a governmental cabinet or to act in the legislative sphere. Accordingly, under the conditions of semi-presidentialism, at least according to its minimalist (modern) definition⁵², president does not necessarily contribute to functioning of governmental cabinet (as in the case of parliamentarism), and governmental cabinet, in turn, does not necessarily promote and popularize a legitimized set of presidential goals (as usually in the case of presidentialism)⁵³.

At the same time, the problem lies in the fact that semi-presidentialism is wide-ranging according to the logic of delegation of authority/powers and responsibility, as well as through the amount of powers of various “principals” and “agents”⁵⁴. For example, in the context of the process of government formation, semi-presidential systems should be divided into the groups where: a president may not agree with the candidacy of a prime minister or with the option of a governmental cabinet; a president may nominate a prime minister’s candidacy or a governmental cabinet’s option and expect the consent/investiture of a legislature; a president may nominate a prime minister and a governmental cabinet without the consent or investiture of a legislature. The differentiated logics is also evident in the case of governmental cabinets’ resignation in the conditions of semi-presidentialism, since they can be carried out: exclusively by legislatures, which may be early dissolved by presidents; exclusively by legislatures, which cannot be early dissolved by presidents; unlimitedly by presidents and legislatures; by presidents and legislatures, but with the limitation of powers of legislatures by the powers of presidents⁵⁵. The difference is also observed in the case of regulating the legislative agenda, since these powers are exclusively directed by governmental cabinets or presidents and governmental cabinets in semi-presidential systems. Moreover, presidents in some semi-presidential states have the right

⁵² Elgie R., *The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism*, [w:] Elgie R. (ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 13.; Elgie R., *What is Semi-presidentialism and Where is it Found*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S. (eds.), *Semi-presidentialism Outside Europe: A Comparative Study*, Wyd. Routledge 2007, s. 2–6.

⁵³ Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., Party Control over European Cabinets?, *European Journal of Political Research* 2009, vol 48, nr. 4, s. 665–693.

⁵⁴ Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., Citizens, Presidents and Assemblies: The Study of Semi-Presidentialism beyond Duverger and Linz, *British Journal of Political Science* 2009, vol 39, nr. 4, s. 871–992.; Hellman J., Constitutions and Economic Reform in the Postcommunist Transitions, *East European Constitutional Review* 1996, vol 5, nr. 1, s. 46–56.; Frye T., A Politics of Institutional Choices: Post-Communist Presidencies, *Comparative Political Studies* 1997, vol 30, nr. 5, s. 523–552.; Metcalf L. K., Measuring Presidential Power, *Comparative Political Studies* 2000, vol 33, nr. 5, s. 657.; Siaroff A., Comparative presidencies: the inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary distinction, *European Journal of Political Research* 2003, vol 42, nr. 3, s. 287–312.

⁵⁵ Shugart M., Semi-presidential systems: Dual executive and mixed authority patterns, *French Politics* 2005, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 336–337.

of the block/complete legislative veto, while in others systems they have only the right of the partial legislative veto. Finally, in other states, presidents are empowered to issue decrees with the force of law⁵⁶, etc. This means that the balance of inter-institutional (“principal-agent”) relations in the conditions of semi-presidentialism can vary from the prevalence of legislatures to the prevalence of presidents or even to their equilibrium. However, even despite this, the “core” of the “chain” of delegation of powers and responsibility, which attributes semi-presidentialism, remains constant. Instead, the other inter-institutional attributes of semi-presidentialism determine exclusively the probability and ways, in which political actors and institutions achieve their desired goals, and the likelihood of conflicts among them, and therefore indefinitely testify the similarity among semi-presidentialism, presidentialism and parliamentarism⁵⁷. Accordingly, semi-presidentialism can actually, politically and behaviorally (nevertheless, not formally, institutionally and procedurally) look like presidentialism or parliamentarism⁵⁸. However, it is the formal (constitutional) structure of the delegation of powers and responsibility in the conditions of semi-presidentialism that forms and “crystallizes” the patterns of potential variability of the operationalization of this system of government in practice⁵⁹.

In other words, the consequence of the attribution of semi-presidentialism in the theory of agent relations is the fact that semi-presidentialism is behaviorally diversified depending on the presence of two “basic agents”, i.e. a president and a parliament, through which voters can potentially influence governance and politics in general⁶⁰. In institutional terms, this is finalized by the fact that semi-presidentialism is attributed to the incomplete separation of powers, since both president and parliament appear as common “principals” of a governmental cabinet, and therefore they should agree on it and control it⁶¹. This, in turn, predetermines a specific nature and composition of a governmental cabinet and a peculiar process of governance, since the “principals” of a governmental cabinet are electorally different in their origin and purposes (this is manifested in the fact that presidential electoral campaigns are much wider than electoral campaigns of parties

⁵⁶ Huber J., Restrictive Legislative Procedures in France and the United States, *American Political Science Review* 1992, vol 86, nr. 3, s. 675–687.; Huber J., *Rationalizing Parliament: Legislative Institutions and Party Politics in France*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1996.

⁵⁷ Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., *Russia: The Benefits and Perils of Presidential Leadership*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S. (eds.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Central and Eastern Europe*, Wyd. Manchester University Press 2008, s. 159–179.

⁵⁸ Lijphart A., *Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1999, s. 121–122.; Frison-Roche F., *Semi-presidentialism in a post-communist context*, [w:] Elgie R., Moestrup S. (eds.), *Semi-presidentialism outside Europe: a comparative study*, Wyd. Routledge 2007, s. 67–73.

⁵⁹ Shugart M., Semi-presidential systems: Dual executive and mixed authority patterns, *French Politics* 2005, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 323–351.; Amorim Neto O., Strøm K., Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies, *British Journal of Political Science* 2006, vol 36, nr. 4, s. 619–643.; Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., Party Control over European Cabinets?, *European Journal of Political Research* 2009, vol 48, nr. 4, s. 665–693.

⁶⁰ Pasquino G., Nomination: Semi-presidentialism: A Political Model at Work, *European Journal of Political Research* 1997, vol 31, nr. 1, s. 128–146.; Nousiainen J., From Semi-Presidentialism to Parliamentary Government: Political and Constitutional Developments in Finland, *Scandinavian Political Studies* 2001, vol 24, nr. 1, s. 101.

⁶¹ Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., Party Government in Europe? Parliamentary and Semipresidential Democracies Compared, *European Journal of Political Research* 2009, vol 48, nr. 5, s. 665–693.; Shugart M., *Comparative Executive-Legislative Relations*, [w:] Rhodes A. W., Binder S., Rockman B. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2006, s.358.

and individual parliamentary candidates; moreover, they even unite and combine them⁶²). As a result, even a prime minister and ministers from the same party as a president, in particular, when they have or enjoy the support of majority in legislature, are not “absolutely reliable agents” of the head of state⁶³. That is why governmental cabinets in the conditions of semi-presidentialism are often and unreasonably formed on the basis of delegation of powers to both party and non-party ministers⁶⁴. In other words, presidents in semi-presidential systems have much more incentives to include non-party, rather than party ministers in governmental cabinets, since the heads of state thus contribute to the realization of their political and electoral goals. Identical or similar situation is about solving the issues of foreign and defense policy in semi-presidentialism⁶⁵, since the heads of state in this context try to dominate prime ministers and governmental cabinets in general. The conclusion is that semi-presidentialism a priori weakens party-government relations, resulting in greater variation in the relations between parties and governmental cabinets than any other system of government⁶⁶. This is especially common in a situation where the balance of powers in inter-institutional relations is balanced or concentrated/displaced in favor of president’s institution⁶⁷. Since a strong president, assigning or influencing the appointment of a prime minister, that is the main result and endogenous factor of government formation, formally or informally affects the composition of the entire governmental cabinet and, accordingly, various subject areas and functions of a governmental cabinet⁶⁸. We observe a similar effect when the negotiating power of a parliament proves to be politically limited that, in turn, is the result of its excessive party fractionalization. Therefore, as Shugart⁶⁹ points out, party systems, characterized by a lack of a clear distinction between a governmental cabinet and opposition, are characterized by the presence of a president’s institute, which de facto has more freedom of action than other political actors.

⁶² Amorim Neto O., Strøm K., Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies, „*British Journal of Political Science*” 2006, vol 36, nr. 4, s. 619–643.

⁶³ Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., Who’s in Charge? Presidents, Assemblies, and the Political Control of Semipresidential Cabinets, „*Comparative Political Studies*” 2010, vol 43, nr. 11, s. 1415–1441.

⁶⁴ Thiebault J.-L., *France: Forming and maintaining government coalitions in the Fifth Republic*, [w:] Müller W., Strøm K. (eds.), *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2000, s. 514.; Protsyk O., Troubled Semi-Presidentialism: Stability of the Constitutional System and Cabinet in Ukraine, „*Europe-Asia Studies*” 2003, vol 55, nr. 7, s. 1077–1095.; Costa Lobo M., *The Emergence of a Prime Ministerial Model: Portuguese Government Coordination, 1976–1995*, Wyd. University of Oxford 2001.

⁶⁵ Arter D., *Politics and policy-making in Finland*, Wyd. Wheatsheaf/St Martin’s Press 1987.; Hayward J., *From republican sovereign to partisan statesman*, [w:] Harrison M., Hayward J. (eds.), *De Gaulle to Mitterrand: Presidential power in France*, Wyd. Hurst 1993, s. 1–35.

⁶⁶ Shugart M., Carey J., *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992.; Siaroff A., Comparative presidencies: the inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary distinction, „*European Journal of Political Research*” 2003, vol 42, nr. 3, s. 287–312.; Protsyk O., Prime ministers’ identity in semi-presidential regimes: Constitutional norms and cabinet formation outcomes, „*European Journal of Political Research*” 2005, vol 44, nr. 5, s. 721–748.; Shugart M., Semi-presidential systems: Dual executive and mixed authority patterns, „*French Politics*” 2005, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 323–351.; Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., Who’s in Charge? Presidents, Assemblies, and the Political Control of Semipresidential Cabinets, „*Comparative Political Studies*” 2010, vol 43, nr. 11, s. 1415–1441.; Morgan-Jones E., Schleiter P., Governmental change in a president-parliamentary regime: The case of Russia 1994–2003, „*Post-Soviet Affairs*” 2004, vol 20, nr. 2, s. 132–163.

⁶⁷ Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., Party Government in Europe? Parliamentary and Semipresidential Democracies Compared, „*European Journal of Political Research*” 2009, vol 48, nr. 5, s. 665–693.

⁶⁸ Schleiter P., Morgan-Jones E., Citizens, Presidents and Assemblies: The Study of Semi-Presidentialism beyond Duverger and Linz, „*British Journal of Political Science*” 2009, vol 39, nr. 4, s. 871–992.

⁶⁹ Shugart M., *Comparative Executive-Legislative Relations: Hierarchies vs. Transactions in Constitutional Design*, Wyd. Center for the Study of Democracy Paper 2005.

Somewhat controversial logic is maintained by Roper, Morgan-Jones and Schleiter, who note that in some semi-presidential systems, which are characterized by less developed party systems, the confrontation between a president and a prime minister leads to institutional and political instability, and in other semi-presidential systems it increases the effectiveness of cooperation between a president and a legislature⁷⁰. According to Protsyk⁷¹, the latest scenario is often due to the fact that “clientelist” parties (in the form of narrow agreements on a governmental cabinet) negotiate with a president and a parliament. In this case, a popularly elected and strong president largely compensates for the relative lack of well-organized parties that are needed in order to provide a well-functioning system of government. Accordingly, we conclude that constitutional (institutionally-procedural) and political (politically-behavioral) descriptors of the attribution of semi-presidentialism occur through the prism of the theory of agent (“principal-agent”) relations, which are manifested in the fact that party-governmental relations in semi-presidentialism, in contrast to other systems of government, are susceptible to constitutional and political changes.

The theory of “veto players”, which appeals to the analysis of the powers of political institutions, inter-institutional relations, their place through the prism of party and electoral systems and in the cut of different ideologies that are tangential to systems of government, also occupies an important place in the attribution of semi-presidentialism⁷² (although, within its minimalist (post-classical) tradition of defining). As Shen and Tsebelis remark, the theory of “veto players” is an analytical tool that can be used to analyze the status quo change in the context of inter-institutional relations of individual “veto players”, which are individuals and collective political actors whose treaties and agreements are necessary to change the status quo⁷³. This is important given the scientists’ assumption that the stability of inter-institutional relations (and the ability to make political decisions) in the context of different systems of government increases in the event of a decrease in the number of “players with veto powers”, reducing the ideological difference and distance between them, as well as in the event of reducing the internal unity and cohesion of collective “veto players”⁷⁴. In this cut, it is noticeable that semi-presidentialism is much more difficult to operationalize than any other system of government, since institutional “players with the right of veto” within its framework are usually “vague” and difficultly differentiated, resulting in the increasing of the influence of various “agents of the

⁷⁰ Roper S., Are all semi-presidential regimes the same? A comparison of premier-presidential regimes, *„Comparative Politics“* 2002, vol 34, nr. 3, s. 253–272.; Morgan-Jones E., Schleiter P., Governmental change in a president-parliamentary regime: The case of Russia 1994–2003, *„Post-Soviet Affairs“* 2004, vol 20, nr. 2, s. 132–163.

⁷¹ Protsyk O., Troubled Semi-Presidentialism: Stability of the Constitutional System and Cabinet in Ukraine, *„Europe-Asia Studies“* 2003, vol 55, nr. 7, s. 1077–1095.

⁷² Elgie R., From Linz to Tsebelis: three waves of presidential/parliamentary studies?, *„Democratization“* 2005, vol 12, nr. 1, s. 115.

⁷³ Shen Y.-C., Using the Veto Players Theory to Explain the Stability of Semi-Presidential Regimes, *„International Journal of Humanities and Social Science“* 2011, vol 1, nr. 9, s. 87–102.; Shen Y.-C., *Veto Players Theory and the Stability of Semi-Presidential Regimes*, XXIIPSA World Congress of Political Science, Santiago, July 12–16, 2009.

⁷⁴ Tsebelis G., Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartism, *„British Journal of Political Science“* 1995, vol 25, nr. 3, s. 293.; Ganghof S., Promises and Pitfalls of Veto Player Analysis, *„Swiss Political Science Review“* 2003, vol 9, nr. 1–2, s. 1–25.; Tsebelis G., *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*, Wyd. Russell Sage Foundation 2002, s. 19–63.

agenda change” in inter-institutional relations. It is regulated by the fact that constitutions of semi-presidential states do not always clearly and unambiguously distinguish the roles, powers and responsibilities of various political actors, which, depending on the complementary factors of political process (in particular, the relation among political institutions and majority in legislature) and inter-institutional relations, modify the institutionally-procedural and politically-behavioral attribution of semi-presidentialism. So, if a parliamentary majority is under the control of a president or a party of a president, the head of state has a good chance to realize his or her electoral goals. However, on the other hand, the same can be said about the regulation of political process by a prime minister whose party controls a majority in a legislature. The controversial situation is typical in the case when a president and his/her party cannot control a majority in a legislature, as a result of which a prime minister cannot be strictly subordinated to a president. This means that the separation or unification of inter-institutional relations in the vector “president–governmental cabinet–parliamentary majority” is an explanatory variable of the attribution of semi-presidentialism⁷⁵. Moreover, it regulates that the main thing is not the differences between systems of government (i.e. presidentialism, semi-presidentialism and parliamentarism), but the differences in inter-institutional relations within each of them, that is the differences between the types and scenarios of semi-presidentialism⁷⁶. A vivid expression of the importance of such a comment is the fact that prime minister is quite often constitutionally positioned as the head of the executive, but in practice the direction of executive and governmental activity is determined by a president. Accordingly, the way how a constitution and political practice divide executive (administrative) powers and hierarchical and transactional relations among the institutions in the system of executive dualism is a determining factor in the attribution, stability and effectiveness of semi-presidentialism⁷⁷.

Imposing such features of the attribution of semi-presidentialism on the theory of “veto players” and realizing that “veto players” under the conditions of semi-presidentialism are all those who can influence (approve, reject, revise) the implementation of political process or political decisions⁷⁸ (especially in the context of the executive dualism), it is obvious that “veto

⁷⁵ Elgie R., *Divided Government in Comparative Perspective*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2001, s. 10–12.; Lin J.-W., A Veto Player Theory of Policy Making in Semi-Presidential Regimes: The Case of Taiwan’s Ma Ying-jeou Presidency, *Journal of East Asian Studies* 2011, vol 11, nr. 3, s. 407–435.; Duverger M., A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government, *European Journal of Political Research* 1980, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 165–187.; Elgie R., Models of Executive Politics: A Framework for the Study of Executive Power Relations in Parliamentary and Semi-Presidential Regimes, *Political Studies* 1997, vol 45, nr. 2, s. 217–231.; Pasquino G., Nomination: Semi-presidentialism: A Political Model at Work, *European Journal of Political Research* 1997, vol 31, nr. 1, s. 128–146.; Elgie R., Semi-Presidentialism: Concepts, Consequences and Contesting Explanations, *Political Studies Review* 2004, vol 2, nr. 3, s. 314–330.; Tavits M., *Presidents with Prime Ministers: Do Direct Elections Matter?*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 2009.; Samuels D., Shugart M., *Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers: How the Separation of Powers Affects Party Organization and Behavior*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 2010.

⁷⁶ Shugart M., Carey J., *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992.

⁷⁷ Baylis T., Presidents versus Prime Ministers: Shaping Executive Authority in Eastern Europe, *World Politics* 1996, vol 48, nr. 3, s. 297–323.; Kirschke L., Semipresidentialism and the Perils of Power-Sharing in Neopatrimonial States, *Comparative Political Studies* 2007, vol 40, nr. 11, s. 1372–1394.; Shugart M., Semi-presidential systems: Dual executive and mixed authority patterns, *French Politics* 2005, vol 3, nr. 3, s. 323–351.

⁷⁸ Lin J.-W., A Veto Player Theory of Policy Making in Semi-Presidential Regimes: The Case of Taiwan’s Ma Ying-jeou Presidency, *Journal of East Asian Studies* 2011, vol 11, nr. 3, s. 407–435.;

players” themselves can be both formal and informal⁷⁹, as well as both mandatory and optional for a particular scenario and type of inter-institutional relations within semi-presidentialism⁸⁰. For example, the question of whether a president of any semi-presidential state is a “veto player” is rather unusual, since the answer to it depends on constitutional provisions, peculiarities of political practice and on the type of system of government itself. Instead, it is unequivocally clear that a legislature, to which a governmental cabinet is necessarily collectively responsible, is a collective “veto player” under the conditions of semi-presidential system of government. Although, on the other hand, it is not necessary, especially in a multiparty system, to be a “veto player” of any parliamentary party, but only of the political party, which is the main “player” in the formation, support or resignation of a governmental cabinet. In general, this means that party system in semi-presidentialism is too complex to be defined as a collective “veto player”⁸¹: on the one hand (in the conditions of one or two-party systems), it is a collective “veto player” and, on the other hand (in the conditions of different types of multiparty systems), it is or is not a “veto player”. In addition, the number of parties that are “veto players” depends on the quantitative and dimensional attributes and types of governmental cabinets. Accordingly, the outlining of parties as “veto players” in the conditions of semi-presidentialism depends on institutional rules, inter-institutional relations and type and structuring of party systems. At the same time, such “veto players” within the framework of semi-presidentialism as president and parties may to a large extent depend on some informal variables, in particular on constitutional agreements and traditions, as well as on the fact and results of elections (for example, in the processes of formation, support or resignation of governmental cabinets). Although in general, the listed informal variables are not independent “veto players”, since they do not always have the force of coercion and constraints.

Summing up these ideas, Protsyuk⁸² and Radchenko⁸³ argue that semi-presidentialism (in their words, a “mixed republic” or a “mixed form of government”) is determined and conditioned by a restrained model of the division of power, which traces the features of “rigid” (in particular, as in presidentialism) and “soft” (in particular, as in parliamentarism) models, and, respectively, by the corresponding to it system of checks and balances. Bostan⁸⁴ notes that semi-presidentialism (in his words, a “mixed polyarchy”) is based on the “moderate” distribution of the system of supreme bodies of legislative, presidential and governmental powers, where the latter is doubly/

⁷⁹ Shen Y.-C., Using the Veto Players Theory to Explain the Stability of Semi-Presidential Regimes, *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 2011, vol 1, nr. 9, s. 87–102.; Shen Y.-C., *Veto Players Theory and the Stability of Semi-Presidential Regimes*, XXI IPSA World Congress of Political Science, Santiago, July 12–16, 2009, s. 25.

⁸⁰ Shugart M., Carey J., *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press 1992, s. 24.

⁸¹ Martin L., Stevenson R., Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies, *American Journal of Political Science* 2001, vol 45, nr. 1, s. 34.

⁸² Protsyuk I., Zmishana respublika: poniattia ta oznaky, *„Aktualni problemy prava: teoriia i praktyka”* 2012, vol 25, s. 462–471.

⁸³ Radchenko O., Osoblyvosti zastosuvannya pryntsypu rozpodilu derzhavnoi vlady u zmishanykh respublikakh, *„Visnyk Kharkivskoho natsionalnoho universytetu vnutrishnikh sprav”* 2010, vol 1, s. 202–209.

⁸⁴ Bostan S., *Forma pravlinnia suchasnoi derzhavy: problemy istorii, teorii, praktyky*, Zaporizhzhia 2005, s. 290.

dually formed and/or responsible under the condition of joint participation of popularly elected president and legislature. As a result, the following attributes are obtained: the actual “securitization” of a president/the head of state (based on his or her representative mandate received popularly from the people) from interference in his or her activities by other institutions and branches of state power; actual (or at least formal), but multi-step and different in structural and functional terms (based on different distances among institutional relations in the triangle “head of state–governmental cabinet–parliament”) deconcentration, distribution or dualization of the executive between a president/the head of state and a prime minister/the head of governmental cabinet; formal (but not always actual) complete non-membership (or partial membership) of a president/the head of state to any of the branches of state power, provided that he or she can play an active role in political life of a country and significantly influence the functioning of the state mechanism and apparatus. As a consequence, it is often believed the generation of not a triune, but a quadruple (the fourth branch of state power appears to be in a president/the head of state) model of state power, although it is not a mandatory and permanent attribute of semi-presidentialism. This, according to Radchenko⁸⁵, on the one hand, helps to balance state power and establish an effective system of checks and balances, as well as to prevent a significant strengthening of any of the subjects of institutional, procedural, political and behavioral relations and its unrestricted domination in political life of a country, but, on the other hand, it causes conflicts within the state mechanism and apparatus, which do not contribute to political stability. Therefore, according to Serohina, the impression is that under the conditions of semi-presidentialism there is a stabilization of system of government “due to the combination of different equilibrium power principles that form their new unity”⁸⁶. As a result, in this system of government, there almost always (apart from certain institutional, procedural, political and behavioral scenarios and cases) are such aspects of the division of state power as functional, institutional and subjective ones. In addition, a president (mostly as exceptionally the head of state) in the conditions of semi-presidentialism traditionally provides or can provide with its “arbitration” or “neutrality” the coordinated functioning of state authorities, and also must ensure compliance with constitution and laws, national independence and territorial integrity.

At the same time, semi-presidential system of government is determined by other categorical and systematizing factors, some of which are the indicators of this constitutional and political type. For example, regardless of the approach to the conceptualization of various systems of government, semi-presidentialism is traditionally determined by the fact that a governmental cabinet and its prime minister are necessarily collectively responsible (that is, they may be resigned beforehand) to a legislature (parliament, leading or two chambers of parliament) or both to a legislature and a president. In addition, a prime minister and/or a governmental cabinet

⁸⁵ Radchenko O., Osoblyvosti zastosuvannya pryntsyphu rozpodilu derzhavnoi vlady u zmishanykh respublikakh, *Visnyk Kharkivskoho natsionalnoho universytetu vnutrishnikh sprav* 2010, vol 1, s. 202–209.

⁸⁶ Serohina S., Vytoky kontseptsii „zmishane pravlinnia“ v antychnii polityko-pravovii teorii ta praktytsi, *Problemy zakonosti* 2006, vol 78, s. 35.

are generally formed on the basis of a presidential proposal with the only difference that such a proposal may be real (on his or her own accord, regardless of the support of a legislature) or conditional (through the implementation and consideration by the head of state of the will and distribution of political parties within the composition of a legislature and necessarily taking into account the support of a legislature). Moreover, it does not matter whether a governmental cabinet and its prime minister are positioned as pro-presidential (i.e., in the same team with a president) or anti-presidential (i.e., in opposition to the presidential team). Since, the main thing in the definition of semi-presidentialism are exclusively institutional and procedural attributes and the peculiarities of its categorization and systematization as if it has a double/dual nature of the executive, but not the presence or absence of dual executive, as well as the powers of president and parliament in formation and resignation of governmental cabinet and prime minister. This means that the systematic and permanent feature of semi-presidentialism is double or dual nature of the origin and implementation of the executive, but not a double or dual nature of the responsibility of the executive. Since, as noted above, a governmental cabinet and prime minister in semi-presidentialism (in any of its definition) are collectively responsible (that is they may be resigned ahead of time) necessarily to a legislature or to a legislature and a president. Moreover, the political responsibility of a governmental cabinet and prime minister in semi-presidentialism is traditionally more prolonged in the direction of a parliament. The fact is that a legislature (if it participates in the formation of a governmental cabinet) must express its position/agreement (the so-called vote of investiture in governmental cabinet) regarding the formation of a governmental cabinet (i.e., regarding the appointment of a prime minister, the approval of a composition and/or a government program) and is authorized (regardless of the design of inter-institutional relations) to verify the results of the government's activity, embodied in the possibility of its early resignation (i.e., in the vote of no confidence in governmental cabinet).

In addition, semi-presidentialism is characterized or can be characterized by other temporary or transitive institutional and procedural attributes. All of them, by correcting the remarks of Albert⁸⁷, Metcalf⁸⁸, Ludwikowski⁸⁹, McPherson⁹⁰, Protsyuk⁹¹ and Krysenko⁹², can be reduced to such, not always realizable, patterns as: replacement of the president's position with a non-parliamentary and popular way for a fixed term; obligatory collective responsibility of a governmental cabinet and prime minister to a legislature; the appointment of a prime minister

⁸⁷ Albert R., Presidential values in parliamentary democracies, „*International Journal of Constitutional Law*” 2010, vol 8, nr. 2, s. 207–236.

⁸⁸ Metcalf L. K., Presidential Power in the Russian Constitution, „*Journal of Transnational Law & Policy*” 1996, vol 125, s. 125–142.

⁸⁹ Ludwikowski R., “Mixed” Constitutions – Product of an East-Central European Constitutional Melting Pot, „*Boston University International Law Journal*” 1998, vol 16, s. 1–34.

⁹⁰ McPherson C., Russia's 1993 Constitution: Rule of Law for Russia or Merely a Return to Autocracy?, „*Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly*” 1999, vol 27, s. 160–163.

⁹¹ Protsyuk I., Zmishana respublika: poniattia ta oznaky, „*Aktualni problemy prava: teoriia i praktyka*” 2012, vol 25, s. 462–471.

⁹² Krysenko O., Napivprezidentska forma pravlinnia: model instyutsionalnoi stabilizatsii vlady dlia Ukrainy, „*Visnyk Kharkivskoho natsionalnoho universytetu imeni V. N. Karavazina. Seriya: Pytannia politolohii*” 2008, vol 825, s. 114–122.

and the formation of a governmental cabinet under a real or conditional submission by a president; double or dual nature of the origin and implementation, but not the responsibility of the executive (governmental cabinet and prime minister); the constitutional determination of a president neither as the head of the executive, nor as the head of governmental cabinet, but only as the head of state and the “arbiter” or the guarantor in certain spheres of state activity (however, while conferring him or her with the powers in the executive, which leads to executive dualism); presidential dedication to the legislative initiative, legislative veto, promulgation of laws, announcement of referendums and its positioning as a supreme commander of the armed forces; the prerogative of the head of state to convene and chair a governmental cabinet; the authorization of a legislature to impeach a president for committing crimes; probable fixing of the principle of incompatibility of the position of a member of a governmental cabinet with the mandate of a deputy; along with the obligatory collective responsibility of a cabinet to legislature, its dual individual responsibility to a legislature and a president; the president’s prerogative to dissolve a legislature and appoint its early elections; presence of a constitutionally determined list of presidential acts subjected to counter-signature by a prime minister and (or) ministers; control by the highest judicial authority (which has a constitutional jurisdiction) of the correspondence of the acts of a parliament and a president with respect to constitution, etc. Among them, the categorical and systematic (mandatory) principles are the first four, and the complementary (optional) principles are all the rest. Supplemental principle is also (according to constitutional (institutional or formal) definition of semi-presidentialism) the actual set of powers of the main institutions of power in the triangle “the head of state–governmental cabinet–parliament”. It is determined by party and electoral factors and by the ratio among the support of a president and a prime minister by parts (parties, groups and individual deputies) of a legislature, in particular by checking their support or non-support by parliamentary majority, as well as by the participation of each of them in the legislative process. As a result, semi-presidential system of government constitutionally and politically admits the opportunity for a kind of “drift” of inter-institutional relations in the triangle “the head of state–governmental cabinet–parliament”, in particular in terms of changing the balance of power between them. Therefore, according to Tereshchuk⁹³, the status of a president and a prime minister in the conditions of semi-presidentialism may vary depending on the social and political circumstances that arose at one time or another, and even on the authority of politicians who occupy the corresponding positions. This means that semi-presidentialism is categorized and systematized institutionally-procedurally (i.e. formally and constitutionally) and politically-behaviorally (i.e. subjectively and personally).

Synthesizing and systematizing the attributes and characteristics of semi-presidentialism, derived from its maximalist (classical) and minimalist (post-classical) definitions, in particular,

⁹³ Tereshchuk M., Riznovydy respublikanskoi formy pravlinnia: porivnialna kharakterystyka, „*Derzhava i pravo: Zbirnyk naukovykh prats. Seriya: Yurydychni ta politychni nauky*” 2006, vol 33, s. 76.

appealing to the scientific researches of Verney⁹⁴, Lijphart⁹⁵, Sartori⁹⁶, Elgie⁹⁷, Newton⁹⁸, Gerring, Thacker and Moreno⁹⁹, Cheibub, Elkins, Ginsburg, Gandhi and Vreeland¹⁰⁰, etc., we reduce them to a common “uncontroversial” denominator, which covers both definitional (constant), complementary (typological) and temporary (transitive) attributes. The main definitional and constant attributes of semi-presidentialism are the following characteristics of this system of government: popular election of a president for a fixed term; obligatory collective responsibility of a prime minister and a governmental cabinet to a legislature; the combination/dualization of the executive by a president (necessarily as the head of state) and a prime minister (necessarily as the head of government) and governmental cabinet. They are stable and unambiguous and check the presence or absence of a formal (institutionally-procedural) semi-presidential nature of a particular system of government. Instead, the temporary (transitory) attributes of semi-presidentialism are complementary, variational and optional, and therefore their use contributes to identifying the actual (politically-behavioral) nature, as well as increasing the quality of the typology of semi-presidential system of government. They (based on various indicators) should be divided into such groups as: related to the formation and dismissal of governmental cabinets, related to the activities of parliaments, legislative, functional, prescriptive/terminal, etc. In sum, such a theoretical, methodological and operational logic of the attrition of semi-presidentialism satisfies the observations of Cheibub, Elkins and Ginsburg¹⁰¹, according to which there are two sets of characteristics of this system of government. The first (permanent or definitive) set determines whether a certain system of government is institutionally and procedurally semi-presidential one. Instead, the second (temporal or transitive) set complementary and typologically outlines the institutional, procedural, political and behavioral attributes of semi-presidentialism.

⁹⁴ Verney D., *Parliamentary Government and Presidential Government*, [w:] Lijphart A. (ed.), *Parliamentary versus Presidential Government*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1992, s. 31–47.

⁹⁵ Lijphart A., *Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, Wyd. Yale University Press 1999.

⁹⁶ Sartori G., *Comparative Constitutional Engineering. An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes*, London 1997.

⁹⁷ Elgie R., *The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism*, [w:] Elgie R. (ed.), *Semi-Presidentialism in Europe*, Wyd. Oxford University Press 1999, s. 1–21.

⁹⁸ Newton K., *Foundations of Comparative Politics: Democracies of the Modern World*, Wyd. Cambridge University Press, 2005.

⁹⁹ Gerring J., Thacker S., Moreno C., Are Parliamentary Systems Better, *Comparative Political Studies* 2009, vol 42, nr. 3, s. 327–359.

¹⁰⁰ Cheibub J. A., Elkins Z., Ginsburg T., Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism, *British Journal of Political Science* 2014, vol 44, nr. 3, s. 515–544; Cheibub J. A., Gandhi J., Vreeland J., Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited, *Public Choice* 2010, vol 143, s. 67–101.

¹⁰¹ Cheibub J. A., Elkins Z., Ginsburg T., *Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism: On the Hybridization of Constitutional Forms*, Presented at the International Conference on Democracy as Idea and Practice, January 14–15, 2010; Cheibub J. A., Elkins Z., Ginsburg T., Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism, *British Journal of Political Science* 2014, vol 44, nr. 3, s. 515–544.